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Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 
William Baude* 
The doctrine of qualified immunity operates as an unwritten 
defense to civil rights lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It 
prevents plaintiffs from recovering damages for violations of their 
constitutional rights unless a government official violated “clearly 
established law,” which usually requires specific precedent on point. 
This Article argues that the qualified immunity doctrine is unlawful 
and inconsistent with conventional principles of statutory 
interpretation. 
Members of the Supreme Court have offered three different 
justifications for imposing this unwritten defense on the text of 
Section 1983. First, that the doctrine of qualified immunity derives 
from a common-law “good-faith” defense. Second, that it 
compensates for an earlier putative mistake in broadening the 
statute. Third, that it provides “fair warning” to government 
officials, akin to the rule of lenity. 
On closer examination, each of these justifications falls apart 
for a mix of historical, conceptual, and doctrinal reasons. There was 
no such defense; there was no such mistake; lenity ought not apply. 
Furthermore, even if these things were otherwise, the doctrine of 
qualified immunity would not be the best response. 
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The unlawfulness of qualified immunity is of particular 
importance now. Despite its shoddy foundations, the Supreme Court 
has been formally and informally reinforcing the doctrine of 
immunity. In particular, the Court has given qualified immunity a 
privileged place on its agenda reserved for habeas deference and few 
other legal doctrines. Rather than doubling down, the Court ought to 
be beating a retreat. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of qualified immunity prevents government agents from 
being held personally liable for constitutional violations unless the violation 
was of “clearly established law.” This doctrine rests on two pillars: its practical 
consequences and its technical legal justification. 
There is a lot of research on the first pillar, the practical consequences of 
the doctrine. Does it insulate officials too much from liability, leaving them 
without adequate incentives to respect the constitutional rights of those they 
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encounter?1 Is it basically redundant in light of the widespread indemnification 
regimes that prevent officers from having to pay on their own dime?2 Does it 
stall the growth of constitutional doctrine?3 Does it instead facilitate the 
recognition of new constitutional rights?4 This research addresses important 
questions about how qualified immunity does and should work. 
But there has been less careful scrutiny of the second pillar—the legal 
justifications for adopting qualified immunity at all. In part, this may be 
because the justifications are obscure. But once we dig into the doctrine, we 
can see that at various times, the Justices have hinted at three major legal 
justifications for qualified immunity. 
This Article takes those legal rationales seriously to see if they hold up 
and concludes that for the most part, they do not. The modern doctrine of 
qualified immunity is inconsistent with conventional principles of law 
applicable to federal statutes—what Stephen Sachs and I have elsewhere called 
“The Law of Interpretation.”5 While this inquiry may seem narrow,6 it is also 
the first step to reform. Clearing away the legal rationales for qualified 
immunity lets us see whether there is some other reason that we nonetheless 
ought to retain the doctrine. 
Indeed, one reason that the Court’s immunity jurisprudence is so 
impervious to practical criticism may be a sense that immunity somehow 
derives from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, and so it is not the 
Court’s job to change it. That would analogize qualified immunity to the 
stringent restrictions on habeas relief contained in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), enacted by Congress in 1996. In a 
series of decisions enforcing AEDPA, the Court has called that statute “a 
provision of law that some federal judges find too confining, but that all federal 
judges must obey.”7 The Court takes a similar attitude toward the enforcement 
of qualified immunity, referring to “the importance of qualified immunity ‘to 
 
 1. Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519–24 (2016) (arguing that qualified immunity, among other things, contributes 
to police violence); see 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE 
LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8:5 (4th ed. 2016). 
 2. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014). 
 3. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 4. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 
99–110 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 915 (1999). 
 5. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 
(2017). 
 6. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 506–07 (2011) (“Critics of official immunity who confine themselves to 
narrowly textual, historical, and precedential analysis risk missing vitally important questions of 
constitutional implementation that immunity doctrines inescapably implicate.”). 
 7. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (2014). 
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society as a whole.’”8 But that attitude is justified only if qualified immunity 
really is required by law. If it is not, if its legal justifications fail, then the 
decision to keep or change it is the Court’s responsibility.9 Thus, the 
investigation of the Court’s legal justifications for qualified immunity 
reinforces, rather than supplants, the many functional challenges to immunity 
doctrine. 
This inquiry is timely—perhaps even urgent. Over the past several 
decades, the Court has been slowly changing the doctrinal formula for qualified 
immunity. Most recently, it has begun to strengthen qualified immunity’s 
protection in another way: by giving qualified immunity cases pride of place on 
the Court’s docket. It exercises jurisdiction in cases that would not otherwise 
satisfy the certiorari criteria and reaches out to summarily reverse lower courts 
at an unusual pace. Essentially, the Court’s agenda is to especially ensure that 
lower courts do not improperly deny any immunity. This approach sends a 
strong signal to lower courts and elevates official-protective qualified 
immunity cases to a level of attention exceeded only by the Court’s state-
protective habeas docket. 
While the Court doubles down on qualified immunity, the doctrine has 
also come under increasing outside criticism. Recently publicized episodes of 
police misconduct vividly illustrate the costs of unaccountability. Indeed, the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund has explicitly called for “re-examining the legal 
standards governing . . . qualified immunity.”10 The legal director of the ACLU 
of Massachusetts has named the doctrine of qualified immunity as among the 
policing precedents that “we must seek to tear down.”11 Judge Jon Newman has 
argued that “the defense of qualified immunity should be abolished” by 
Congress.12 These calls make it all the more important to figure out whether the 
modern doctrine of qualified immunity has a legal basis in the first place. 
 
 8. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)); see also infra Part II.B. 
 9. In this sense, this Article updates and corrects Jack Beermann’s “critical analysis” of 
Section 1983 and qualified immunity, which concluded several decades ago that “legalistic analysis of 
§ 1983” was largely “indeterminate.” Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with 
Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 53 (1989). 
 10. LDF Statement on the Non-Indictment of Cleveland Police Officers in the Shooting Death 
of Tamir Rice, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-
release/ldf-statement-non-indictment-cleveland-police-officers-shooting-death-tamir-rice 
[https://perma.cc/9KMQ-PCFA]. 
 11. Matthew Segal, Opinion, Beyond #BlackLivesMatter: Police Reform Must Be Bolstered by 
Legal Action, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/27/beyond-black-lives-matter-police-reform-
legal-action [https://perma.cc/J9EK-B6AX]. 
 12. Jon O. Newman, Opinion, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for 
Money, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-a-better-way-
to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-
d6005beac8b3_story.html [https://perma.cc/9R6N-323Z]; see also Aziz Huq, Revive Congressional 
Authority over Courts, 39 DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS (Winter 2016), 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/revive-congressional-authority-over-courts 
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This Article argues that it does not. Part I discusses the Court’s three 
proffered justifications for qualified immunity, reconstructing the reasoning of 
each one and then explaining its legal flaws. Part II discusses the implications 
of this legal analysis going forward, with special attention to the Supreme 
Court’s new elevation of qualified immunity to special certiorari status. 
I. 
THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The statute colloquially known as “Section 1983,” because it is codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, makes liable state actors who violate constitutional or other 
legal rights. It was first enacted during Reconstruction as a section of the 1871 
Ku Klux Act, part of a suite of “Enforcement Acts” designed to help combat 
lawlessness and civil rights violations in the southern states. The statute 
originally provided: 
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be 
subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary 
notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be 
prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, 
with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and 
other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the 
provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-
six, entitled “An act to protect all persons in the United States in their 
civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication”; and the 
other remedial law of the United States which are in their nature 
applicable in such cases.13 
As currently codified in the U.S. Code, the statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
 
[https://perma.cc/6F9P-VCU5] (arguing that Congress “should narrow or abolish the doctrine of 
‘qualified immunity’”). 
 13. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). A few years later, Congress rephrased and reenacted the provision as Section 
1979 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights, 
ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). Formally, that is the 
statute that gives the provision force today. CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 785–87, 
786 & n. 41 (2010). 
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shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia.14 
Neither version of the text, you will notice if you wade through them, 
makes any reference to immunity. (The reference to the “same rights” and 
“other remedies” in the original statute pointed to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
which provided broad federal remedial authority, Supreme Court review, and 
presidential authority to direct prosecutions and use the military to enforce the 
Act.)15 
Yet that is not the end of the matter. Legal texts that seem categorical on 
their faces are frequently “defeasible”—that is, they are subject to implicit 
exceptions made by other rules of law.16 “No vehicles in the park” might forbid 
ambulances from entering, but a separate rule of law may nonetheless provide 
an exception for government vehicles or for responses to an emergency.17 
Perhaps more to the point, legal provisions are often subject to defenses 
derived from common law. For example, the common-law rules of self-
defense, duress, and necessity can all apply to criminal statutes that do not even 
mention them.18 Similarly, I have elsewhere defended the current doctrine of 
state sovereign immunity even though it, too, is an unwritten defense that goes 
almost unmentioned in the text of the Constitution.19 So perhaps Section 198320 
permits such an unwritten immunity defense despite its seemingly categorical 
provisions for liability. 
To say that an unwritten defense can exist, however, is not to say that any 
particular unwritten defense is in fact legally justified. Such defenses come 
from other legal sources and must be justified on their own legal terms. That is 
 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The equivalent federal cause of action has been subsequently supplied 
by federal common law, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971), and one might imagine that it would have produced distinct questions of unwritten 
immunity, cf. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 482, 548 (1982). But so far, the Court has mechanically equated the two sets of 
immunities, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999), so this Article will not consider them 
separately. 
 15. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 3, 8–10, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 16. Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1101, 1107–08. 
 17. Id. at 1106–07. 
 18. Id. at 1105–06. 
 19. William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2017). 
 20. For ease of exposition and recognition, this Article refers to the statute anachronistically as 
“Section 1983”—not the Ku Klux Act, Section 1979, or its other nicknames—regardless of historical 
period. 
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why it is so important to understand the ostensible legal basis for qualified 
immunity. After disentangling the Court’s many immunity cases, three possible 
bases for the doctrine surface. 
The first, which is perhaps the most well known, is that qualified 
immunity derives from a putative common-law rule that existed when Section 
1983 was adopted.21 But this argument does not withstand historical scrutiny, 
and the Court has been inconsistent in adhering to it. If that argument fails, the 
cases suggest two alternative justifications that have not received enough 
notice. One is that qualified immunity is legitimate compensation for a 
different error the Court supposedly made earlier in construing the scope of 
Section 1983. The other is that qualified immunity derives from principles of 
fair notice analogous to the criminal law rule of lenity. Upon closer 
examination, none of these rationales can sustain the modern doctrine of 
qualified immunity. 
Let us examine each one in turn. 
A. The Historical Good-Faith Defense 
To understand the first account of qualified immunity requires a few 
words about the historical transformation caused by Section 1983. Before the 
Civil War, suits for damages against government officials were not litigated 
directly as constitutional torts. Rather, constitutional claims emerged as part of 
a suit to enforce general common-law rights. As Akhil Amar has helpfully 
summarized, “Plaintiff would sue defendant federal officer in trespass; 
defendant would claim federal empowerment that trumped the state law of 
trespass under the principles of the supremacy clause; and plaintiff, by way of 
reply, would play an even higher supremacy clause trump: Any federal 
empowerment was ultra vires and void” because the defendant acted 
unconstitutionally.22 (Such claims involved federal officials because until the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment few constitutional prohibitions of 
consequence applied to state officers.) 
For instance, a New York merchant might bring a trespass action, 
demanding $100,000 against a U.S. military officer for taking command of his 
horses, mules, and wagons. The officer would respond that he had a lawful 
right to do so because of orders given as part of an authorized military action. 
The merchant would then respond that any such orders were unconstitutional 
under the Takings or Due Process Clauses, thus stripping the officer of his 
 
 21. Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1133–34 (discussing idea of “adoption rules”). 
 22. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1506 (1987). 
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defense.23 Constitutional rights were litigated through the procedural 
framework of general common-law torts, not as freestanding damages claims.24 
Section 1983 changed this framework. It created a direct cause of action 
against state officials for “the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the 
Constitution”25 and thus eliminated the need to first allege a common-law 
claim or damages. In Hohfeld’s terms,26 most constitutional rights went from 
being treated as rules about power to being treated as duties.27 As a result, 
Section 1983 raised questions about how the new constitutional claims related 
to the old common-law claims, and whether the common law had any role to 
play in the new constitutional suits. 
1. The Court’s Account 
The most widely known theory of qualified immunity draws upon this 
historical background in a general way, arguing that the immunity is a 
common-law backdrop that could be read into the statute—like, perhaps, the 
absolute immunities of legislative and judicial officials. The theory creates the 
backdrop by drawing analogies to the rules that governed common-law torts. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pierson v. Ray pioneered the key 
intellectual move.28 In 1961, several Mississippi police officers arrested a 
group of people, including Reverend Robert Pierson, under an anti-loitering 
law for refusing to leave a segregated bus terminal.29 In 1965, in a different 
case, the Supreme Court seemed to hold the Mississippi statute unconstitutional 
in very similar factual circumstances.30 In 1967, in Pierson v. Ray, the Court 
 
 23. This example is drawn from Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), but there 
are many more, see, for example, Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806). 
 24. Claims for equitable relief had a related but more complicated history, see, for example, 
Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional Adjudication in Federal 
Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 688–91 (2009); John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief 
in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2013), but this is beside the point for present 
purposes since qualified immunity applies to damages claims, not claims for equitable relief. 
 25. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). At the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment applied many more 
constitutional constraints to the states. 
 26. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32–44 (1913). 
 27. Cf. John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 333, 340–41 (1998) (“Rules about duty and rules about power differ importantly, especially 
with respect to the consequences of their violation. . . . Criminals are punished, and trespassers must 
provide compensation, but the law attaches no price to an act that fails to comply with a power rule.”); 
see also John Harrison, Power, Duty, and Facial Invalidity, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501, 510 (2013). 
 28. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 29. Id. at 549. 
 30. Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524, 524 (1965). I write “seemed to” because the 
decision was a one-sentence summary reversal of the sort that Professor Alexander Bickel called 
“opinions that do not opine and . . . per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between 
the authorities they cite and the results they decree.” Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, 
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957). 
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then ruled that the police should not be held liable under the Fourth 
Amendment for the 1961 arrests. Why? Because in a common-law suit for false 
arrest, “a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable 
for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved,” 
and that could arguably be extended to “excusing him from liability for acting 
under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held 
unconstitutional.”31 
The newer constitutional tort, the Court held, should be read the same 
way: 
[Section] 1983 “should be read against the background of tort liability 
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his 
actions.” Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of police 
officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable 
cause. We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, 
which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the 
common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available 
to them in the action under [Section] 1983.32 
On its face, one might have expected this reasoning to be limited to false 
arrests or other torts with similar elements, but the Court rapidly expanded it to 
executive action generally.33 One might also have expected this reasoning to 
support a subjective defense of good faith, but the Court has since transformed 
it into an objective analysis of “the objective reasonableness of an official’s 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law.”34 
In the course of transforming qualified immunity into its modern form, the 
Court did not always repeat this common-law “background” argument as 
frequently, perhaps because looking at the history would cause one to question 
the transformations.35 But in Filarsky v. Delia36 a more recent opinion by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the Court invoked the common-law background once again, 
suggesting that it remains an important grounding for the legitimacy of the 
doctrine. In that case, the contested issue was immunity for those who work 
with the government without being its employees. The Court ruled that such 
immunity was largely available to non-employees, but before doing so went out 
of its way to reinforce the historical theory of immunity: 
At common law, government actors were afforded certain protections 
 
 31. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555. 
 32. Id. at 556–57 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). 
 33. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (“[S]ince the options which a chief executive 
and his principal subordinates must consider are far broader and far more subtle than those made by 
officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion must be comparably broad.”). 
 34. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 35. For developments between Pierson and Harlow, see David Rudovsky, The Qualified 
Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional 
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 38–42 (1989). 
 36. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012). 
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from liability, based on the reasoning that “the public good can best be 
secured by allowing officers charged with the duty of deciding upon 
the rights of others, to act upon their own free, unbiased convictions, 
uninfluenced by any apprehensions.” Our decisions have recognized 
similar immunities under § 1983, reasoning that common law 
protections “‘well grounded in history and reason’ had not been 
abrogated ‘by covert inclusion in the general language’ of § 1983.” 37 
Since the foundation of immunity had not been questioned by the parties, 
the passage’s purpose is slightly unclear. The Court relied on history to answer 
the actual question presented (i.e., whether immunity should depend on 
employee status),38 so it is possible that the Court needed to first reassert that 
history was a useful guide to this area. In any event, it is emblematic of the 
Court’s approach to official immunities: purportedly, at least, official 
immunities must be grounded in some kind of construction of the statute in 
light of its history rather than justified on sheer policy consequences. 
Preliminarily, note that the Court’s references to common law here are 
concrete and historically fixed. The Court is not using common law in the 
Benthamite sense, as being “nothing but an alias for ‘judge-made law.’”39 
Filarsky is thus consistent with the Court’s previous insistence that “[w]e do 
not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests 
of what we judge to be sound public policy.”40 It is also consistent with the 
Court’s “reemphasi[s] that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in 
enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are 
guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law tradition.”41 
While “[i]t could be argued” that Section 1983 calls for “contemporary 
common law and equity principles,”42 the Court has disavowed that argument 
as well. Instead, it looks to the traditional common law, asking whether those 
immunities “were so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that 
‘we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished 
to abolish’ them.”43 
 
 37. Id. at 383–84 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa 153, 155–
156 (1864); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 25, at 150 (1941)). 
 38. Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 384–90. 
 39. Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2015). 
 40. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922–23 (1984). 
 41. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). 
 42. Beermann, supra note 9, at 61 n.69 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Congress, the 
argument goes, knew that rules for such proceedings evolve and did not indicate an intention to freeze 
§ 1983 into the rules of 1871.”). 
 43. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 
554–55 (1967)). It is debatable whether this is an accurate citation of Pierson, which referred to the 
“prevailing view,” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555, and therefore can be read to focus on “modern rather than 
nineteenth century tort doctrine.” Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some 
Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 609 (1985); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 
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Similarly, the Court does not treat immunity as a question of “interstitial 
law”44 that incorporates the law of the relevant state, even though it has done so 
for other procedural issues.45 
2. The Historical Problems 
The Court’s account of common-law qualified immunity has several 
historical problems. First, there was no well-established, good-faith defense in 
suits about constitutional violations when Section 1983 was enacted, nor in 
Section 1983 suits early after its enactment. Second, to the limited extent a 
good-faith defense did exist in some common-law suits, it was part of the 
elements of a common-law tort, not a general immunity. Third, qualified 
immunity today is much broader than a good-faith defense. 
a. Legality Instead of Good Faith 
As many scholars of official liability have pointed out, lawsuits against 
officials for constitutional violations did not generally permit a good-faith 
defense during the early years of the Republic.46 
A paradigmatic example is Chief Justice Marshall’s 1804 opinion in Little 
v. Barreme,47 in which naval Captain George Little mistakenly captured a 
Danish boat, The Flying-Fish, and was subsequently sued.48 The Court thought 
it plain that federal law allowed the boat to be seized only if it was going to a 
French port, which it was not.49 But President Adams had issued broader 
instructions to seize boats both going to and coming from French ports, which 
the Court sympathetically noted were “much better calculated to give [the law] 
 
34 n.2 (1983) (defending relevance of “modern tort decisions in construing § 1983”); David 
Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the 
Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 525 (1992). But it is the Court’s position now, anyway. 
 44. William Baude, Beyond DOMA, Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 1371, 1423–27 (2012). 
 45. Kreimer, supra note 43, at 615. 
 46. JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 3–14, 16–17 
(2017); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (1972); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–22 (1987). 
 47. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); see also James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public 
Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1863 (2010) (“No case better illustrates the standards to which federal 
government officers were held than Little v. Barreme.”). Again, the paradigmatic example before the 
Fourteenth Amendment was a federal official. See supra text following note 22. 
 48. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 176. The opinion does not explain who “Barreme” was. In case 
you were wondering (as I was), Francois Barreme was “the supercargo (i.e., the agent for the ship’s 
owner.)” FREDERICK C. LEINER, MILLIONS FOR DEFENSE: THE SUBSCRIPTION WARSHIPS OF 1798, at 
100 (2014). Thanks to Kevin Walsh and Ryan Williams for pointing me to this information. 
 49. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–78. 
56 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:45 
effect,” and without which it “was so obvious . . . that the law would be very 
often evaded.”50 
The question in Captain Little’s case was whether his reliance on the 
President’s instructions could “excuse him” him from liability even though the 
seizure was unlawful.51 The executive construction was a sympathetic one, and 
Chief Justice Marshall thought that the ship had been “seized with pure 
intention.”52 Nonetheless, the Court concluded, “the instructions cannot change 
the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions 
would have been a plain trespass.”53 In other words, good-faith reliance did not 
create a defense to liability—what mattered was legality. 
A personal aside by Chief Justice Marshall helps show the deep roots of 
the legality principle. Before he ultimately acquiesced in the rule established by 
the Court, Marshall explained, “[T]he first bias of my mind was very strong in 
favour of the opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not 
give a right, they might yet excuse from damages.”54 Even then, Marshall 
imagined creating an excuse only because “a distinction ought to be taken 
between acts of civil and those of military officers; and between proceedings 
within the body of the country and those on the high seas.”55 
In other words, even when Marshall was tempted to rule in favor of the 
military officer abroad, he recognized the general principle of liability for 
domestic violations by civil officials—the circumstances that describe almost 
every modern qualified immunity case decided by the Court.56 As other 
scholars have noted, that “strict rule of personal official liability, even though 
its harshness to officials was quite clear,” was a fixture of the founding era.57 
To be sure, the harshness was mediated by a related practice: during the 
antebellum period officials also regularly petitioned Congress for 
indemnification and “succeeded in securing indemnifying private legislation in 
 
 50. Id. at 178. 
 51. Id. The opinion refers to the seizure as “unlawful” rather than specifically 
“unconstitutional,” though it certainly seems as though an unlawful seizure of a ship would have 
violated either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments (more likely the Fifth). See Nathan S. Chapman, Due 
Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2017) (discussing Little v. Barreme as a due 
process case); cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 606 n.154 (1999) (denying that the Fourth Amendment applied to ships). 
 52. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id; see also id. (“That implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of 
their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared to me, 
strongly to imply the principle.”). 
 56. See infra Appendix. One very recent case, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017), 
concerned a border patrol agent who shot a Mexican boy across the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 57. Engdahl, supra note 46, at 19. 
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roughly sixty percent of cases in which they petitioned.”58 But that 
indemnification did not interrupt the courts’ business of enforcing the law. 
The original pattern of personal liability became more complicated over 
time, especially when the government officials were sued for common-law 
torts without constitutional claims.59 Even so, one could still find cases 
applying the founding-era principles throughout the nineteenth century. For 
instance, in 1891, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, through Justice 
Holmes, held that members of a town health board could be held liable for 
mistakenly killing an animal they thought to be diseased, even when 
government commissioners had ordered the killing.60 
More importantly, after Section 1983 was enacted, the Court specifically 
rejected the application of a good-faith defense to constitutional suits under that 
specific statute. The key case is Myers v. Anderson, where the Court held that a 
state statute violated the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in 
voting.61 The case was brought under Section 1983, and the state officials 
argued, among other things, that they could not be liable for money damages if 
they had in good faith thought the statute constitutional.62 Section 1983, they 
claimed, was intended to preserve “traditional limits” such as a common-law 
requirement “that malice be alleged” in voting rights cases.63 
The Court did not spend much time rejecting this argument in its opinion, 
but it did reject it. The Court observed that “[t]he nonliability in any event of 
the election officers for their official conduct is seriously pressed in 
 
 58. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 47, at 1867. As the authors candidly note, the 60 percent 
estimate may not capture all of the unsuccessful petitions or the potentially unsuccessful claims. Id. at 
1867 n.23. 
 59. See Engdahl, supra note 46, at 48–55; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1749–50, 1833 
(1991); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
209, 220–22 (1963); Woolhandler, supra note 46, at 436–57. 
 60. Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100, 100 (Mass. 1891); see also Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice 
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 29–31 (1962) (questioning decision); John H. 
Wigmore, Justice Holmes and the Law of Torts, 29 HARV. L. REV. 601, 615–16 (1916) (praising 
decision). 
 61. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 378–79 (1915); see also Kreimer, supra note 43, at 609 
n.34 (discussing Anderson); Woolhandler, supra note 46, at 457 (same). 
 62. See Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 23–45, Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (Nos. 
8–10). 
 63. Id. at 34–35. Interestingly, the state officials waffled on whether the good-faith defense 
they alleged was constitutionally required. In their initial brief, the officials conceded: “[W]e are not 
making here any contention that Congress might not, if it had chosen to do so, have provided for 
liability in damages on the part of the Election Officials, in a case of this sort without proof of malice 
or corrupt motive.” Id. at 35. But in a supplemental brief, they argued that if the statute imposed strict 
liability, “it is not appropriate legislation under the second section of the Fifteenth Amendment” and 
“would completely destroy the autonomy of the states, and would in effect deprive them of a 
republican form of government secured to them by the Constitution of the United States.” 
Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 3, Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (Nos. 8–10); 
see infra Part II.A. 
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argument”64 by the appellants. But, it concluded, this argument (as well as a 
substantive argument that the Fifteenth Amendment does not apply to 
municipal elections) was “fully disposed of by the ruling this day made in the 
Guinn Case and by the very terms of § 2004, Rev. Stat., Comp. Stat. 1913, 
§ 3966, when considered in the light of the inherently operative force of the 
15th Amendment as stated in the case referred to.”65 In other words, there was 
no good-faith defense. 
While the Court did not elaborate, it is possible that the Court thought that 
the text of Section 1983 did not permit unwritten defenses at all. It is also 
possible, however, that the Court agreed with the lower court’s analysis 
upholding liability. The lower court had been slightly more specific in denying 
the good-faith defense: 
The common sense of the situation would seem to be that, the law 
forbidding the deprivation or abridgment of the right to vote on 
account of race or color being the supreme law, any state law 
commanding such deprivation or abridgment is nugatory and not to be 
obeyed by any one; and any one who does enforce it does so at his 
known peril and is made liable to an action for damages by the simple 
act of enforcing a void law to the injury of the plaintiff in the suit, and 
no allegation of malice need be alleged or proved.66 
This is exactly the logic of the founding-era cases,67 alive and well in the 
federal courts after Section 1983’s enactment. It was not until later in the 
twentieth century that the Court first grafted a good-faith defense to the 
constitutional cause of action. 
b. Not a Freestanding Defense 
This problem with the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine is well known. 
That is why in Filarsky and earlier cases the Court did not point to a good-faith 
defense from constitutional causes of action but rather from common-law 
causes of action. But there is an additional problem. Even to the extent that 
these cases could be imported to the cause of action under Section 1983, they 
generally do not describe a freestanding common-law defense, like state 
 
 64. Myers, 238 U.S. at 378. 
 65. Id. at 378–79. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) was a criminal conspiracy 
prosecution that did not discuss immunity. Section 2004 explicitly confirmed that the right to vote 
extends to municipal elections. An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to Vote in 
the Several States of this Union, and for Other Purposes, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); see also 
Guinn, 238 U.S. at 355–36 (quoting Section 2004). 
 66. Anderson v. Myers, 182 F. 223, 230 (C.C.D. Md. 1910) (emphasis added). 
 67. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 46, at 18 (The public official “was required to judge at his 
peril whether his contemplated act was actually authorized . . . [and] judge at his peril whether . . . the 
state’s authorization-in-fact . . . was constitutional.”). 
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sovereign immunity.68 Instead, those cases mostly describe the individual 
elements of particular common-law torts. 
This distinction is important because an element of a specific tort does not 
provide evidence of a more general backdrop that one would expect to export 
to other claims, let alone from common law to constitutional claims. For 
instance, a Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination claim requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate discriminatory intent by the defendant.69 But it does not 
follow that intent—let alone discriminatory intent—is an element of a due 
process claim.70 Similarly, bad faith and flagrancy were simply elements of 
certain torts brought against public officials. It did not follow that they were 
elements of all torts or all constitutional claims against public officials. 
For instance, one of the earliest Supreme Court cases to discuss the 
negative effects of damages against officers in close cases is the admiralty 
decision The Marianna Flora.71 In that case, the Court declined to “introduce a 
rule harsh and severe in a case of first impression.”72 However, the Court 
considered these harsh effects when defining the substantive rules of capture, 
which were within the Court’s general powers of “conscientious discretion”73 
specially applicable to its admiralty jurisdiction. The Court tethered its 
reasoning to specific facts about rules of capture in admiralty, not to a general 
defense. 
The role of good faith as an element of specific torts, rather than as a 
defense, is even more apparent in Pierson, where the Court pointed to the 
elements of the false arrest tort at common law.74 The Court cited the Second 
Restatement of Torts, which described a “privilege[] to arrest,”75 an Eighth 
Circuit case arising in diversity that applied Missouri law consistent with the 
Second Restatement,76 and a torts treatise to similar effect.77 
Interestingly, Prosser’s 1941 treatise, a few pages after the portion cited in 
Filarsky, notes using the present tense that “courts are being driven slowly” to 
 
 68. Sovereign immunity, which keeps states from being sued without their consent, is “a 
background rule of procedure like waiver or precedent or capacity to sue” that applies regardless of the 
substance of the suit. See Baude, supra note 19, at 8–9. 
 69. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976). 
 70. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (noting that injuries 
“following from something more than negligence but ‘less than intentional conduct’” will sometimes 
give rise to a due process claim). 
 71. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826) (Story, J.). 
 72. Id. at 56. 
 73. Id. at 54–55 (“Even in cases of marine torts, independent of prize, Courts of admiralty are 
in the habit of giving or withholding damages upon enlarged principles of justice and equity, and have 
not circumscribed themselves within the positive boundaries of mere municipal law. They have 
exercised a conscientious discretion upon the subject.”). 
 74. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). 
 75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 76. Missouri ex rel. Ward v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 179 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1950). 
 77. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND 
GRAY ON TORTS § 3.18, at 412 (3d ed. 2006). 
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extend a good-faith immunity “[e]ven as to officers acting under an 
unconstitutional statute.”78 But the “slow[]”79 evolution Prosser describes 
almost entirely post-dated the enactment of Section 1983. Only two of the 
cases he cited were from before 1871, one on each side of the immunity 
question, suggesting that any good-faith defense was protean and contested at 
best.80 
To be sure, because some constitutional doctrine itself borrows concepts 
or rules from the common law, it is possible to envision the elements of an 
individual common-law tort in that garb. But that should occur on the merits 
side of the ledger; there is no justification for reading it into the statutory 
remedy. 
c. The Mismatch Problem 
Finally, even if one were to grant the existence of a good-faith defense 
and import it to constitutional claims, modern immunity cases have distorted 
those common-law rules to a troubling degree. First, qualified immunity is now 
applied “across the board” to all constitutional claims—and perhaps to 
statutory claims as well81—regardless of “the precise character of the particular 
rights,”82 rather than being limited to the kinds of claims where good faith was 
traditionally relevant. Second, instead of the subjective inquiry into intent or 
motive that marked the good-faith inquiry, qualified immunity has become an 
objective standard based on case law.83 This means that even the official who 
acts in bad faith is entitled to the defense if a different official could have 
 
 78. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 153–54 (1941) (emphasis 
added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Compare Kelly v. Bemis, 70 Mass. (70 Gray) 83, 84 (Mass. 1855) (liability for action 
under unconstitutional statute), with State v. McNally, 34 Me. 210, 221 (Me. 1852) (stating, in 
criminal appeal, that “[i]t was no part of the officer’s duty to examine into and decide upon the 
constitutionality or construction of the statute which authorized his warrant”). 
 81. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added) (“We therefore hold 
that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”); Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & 
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” 
Florida Prepaid (and How Not to), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1123 (2001) (“[T]he lower federal courts 
have held the qualified immunity defense to be available against a wide variety of federal statutory 
claims. Even though qualified immunity is plainly available as a defense to some statutory claims, 
however, the courts have acknowledged that the defense is incompatible with certain federal 
statutes.”); see also Kathleen Lockard, Note, Qualified Immunity as a Defense to Federal Wiretap Act 
Claims, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1392–1400 (2001) (arguing against qualified immunity defense to 
wiretap claims). 
 82. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642–43 (1987). As late as 1963, Professor Jaffe 
assumed that the growing discretionary official immunity would nonetheless exclude “the historic 
liability of sheriffs and peace officers” and “[a] police officer, for example, who negligently operates a 
Black Maria.” Jaffe, supra note 59, at 221–22. It does not. 
 83. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–18. 
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reasonably made the mistake.84 Third, as this Article will discuss in more 
depth, qualified immunity’s objective defense has become increasingly 
protective, outstripping other comparable defenses85 and leading the Court on 
the kind of pro-immunity crusade that it normally reserves for legal edicts like 
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Federal Arbitration 
Act.86 
While the Court may not cop to the full force of these historical critiques, 
some Justices have acknowledged elements of them. For instance, in 1992 
Justice Kennedy complained that “qualified immunity for public officials” had 
“diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards.”87 He 
specifically noted that it was “something of a misnomer to describe the 
common law as creating a good-faith defense; we are in fact concerned with the 
essence of the wrong itself, with the essential elements of the tort.”88 Justice 
Kennedy found these deviations problematic because immunity doctrine is 
supposed to be “rooted in historical analogy, based on the existence of 
common-law rules in 1871, rather than in ‘freewheeling policy choice[s].’”89 
Joining a dissenting opinion six years later, Justice Thomas also endorsed 
a historical criticism of qualified immunity, observing that “our treatment of 
qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not purported to be faithful to 
the common-law immunities that existed when § 1983 was enacted, and that 
the statute presumably intended to subsume.”90 And just last term, Justice 
Thomas wrote for himself to observe that “[i]n further elaborating the doctrine 
of qualified immunity for executive officials . . . we have diverged from the 
historical inquiry mandated by the statute” and “have not attempted to locate 
that standard in the common law as it existed in 1871.”91 
But perhaps there is another justification. Indeed, both of these Justices 
have also joined many of the Court’s qualified immunity decisions. While the 
historical justification for qualified immunity has attracted the most attention 
and controversy, the Court’s opinions contain two alternative legal rationales. 
Each of these rationales is sufficiently plausible to warrant consideration on its 
own terms. Let us turn to them next. 
 
 84. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641; see also David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 898–99 (2016) (noting that through qualified immunity doctrine, the Court has 
“disavow[ed] the core conception of bad faith in its efforts to police the police”). 
 85. See infra Part I.C. 
 86. Infra Part II.B. 
 87. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. at 172. 
 89. Id. at 170 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). 
 90. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For further 
discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
 91. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017). Citing an earlier version of this Article, 
Justice Thomas also wrote that “some evidence supports the conclusion that common-law immunity as 
it existed in 1871 looked quite different from our current doctrine.” Id. 
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B. The Two-Wrongs-Make-A-Right Theory 
1. The Crawford-El Account 
One of the two alternative legal justifications for qualified immunity is in 
a surprisingly obscure dissenting opinion in Crawford-El v. Britton. In 
Crawford-El, the Court rejected the application of a heightened pleading 
standard in qualified immunity cases.92 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, dissented. Justice Scalia did not really maintain that the pleading 
standard could be justified on its own terms but instead argued instead that 
while qualified immunity might be wrong, it was a wrong justified by an earlier 
wrong in interpreting the statute.93 
Our qualified immunity jurisprudence is inconsistent with the intended 
meaning of the statute, Justice Scalia conceded.94 But qualified immunity 
operates as a defense to the scope of liability under Section 1983, and we have 
so misinterpreted Section 1983 that qualified immunity is a fair enough 
response. 
Here is the critical paragraph: 
[O]ur treatment of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not 
purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed 
when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to 
subsume. That is perhaps just as well. The § 1983 that the Court 
created in 1961 bears scant resemblance to what Congress enacted 
almost a century earlier. I refer, of course, to the holding of Monroe v. 
Pape, which converted an 1871 statute covering constitutional 
violations committed “under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of any State,” into a statute covering 
constitutional violations committed without the authority of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, and 
indeed even constitutional violations committed in stark violation of 
state civil or criminal law. As described in detail by the concurring 
opinion of Judge Silberman in this case, Monroe changed a statute that 
had generated only 21 cases in the first 50 years of its existence into 
one that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each 
year, and engages this Court in a losing struggle to prevent the 
Constitution from degenerating into a general tort law. (The present 
suit, involving the constitutional violation of misdirecting a package, is 
a good enough example.) Applying normal common-law rules to the 
statute that Monroe created would carry us further and further from 
what any sane Congress could have enacted. 
We find ourselves engaged, therefore, in the essentially legislative 
activity of crafting a sensible scheme of qualified immunities for the 
 
 92. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 574. 
 93. Id. at 611–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. 
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statute we have invented—rather than applying the common law 
embodied in the statute that Congress wrote.95 
Justice Scalia’s theory is an example of what various scholars have called 
“compensating adjustments”96 or “equilibrium adjustments,”97 whereby the 
Court will correct the course of an old doctrine by inventing a new one that 
tacks back the other way. 
Such adjustments should be familiar to those who have read Justice 
Scalia’s other opinions about official liability. In the 1971 decision Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents,98 the Supreme Court recognized a 
cause of action for constitutional damages against federal officers, analogous to 
the Section 1983 cause of action against state officers. In subsequent cases 
about the scope of the Bivens action, Justice Scalia repeatedly and uniformly 
refused to recognize it. He did not attempt to justify these votes on Bivens’s 
own terms, but rather on the grounds that Bivens was a mistake. Because there 
was no statutory basis for the Court’s original decision (there was and is no 
statute equivalent to Section 1983 for federal officers), he dismissed Bivens as 
a “relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to 
create causes of action,” an approach it had since “abandoned.”99 
Under this theory of qualified immunity, it does not matter whether the 
doctrine can be justified on first principles. It is a judicially invented immunity 
for a judicially “invented” statute.100 Two wrongs, Justice Scalia might have 
said, can make a right.101 
2. The “Under Color of” Problem 
This second theory suffers from two legal deficiencies. The first problem 
is that Justice Scalia’s premise—that Monroe v. Pape was wrongly decided—
appears to be wrong. Monroe v. Pape confronted the tricky question of when 
illegal executive action is covered by Section 1983.102 The statute refers to 
 
 95. Id. at 611–12 (internal citations omitted). 
 96. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
421, 421–22 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional 
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1739 (2005). 
 97. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 478 (2011). 
 98. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 99. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131–32 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 
537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). One can, therefore, imagine a separate and distinct two-
wrongs-make-a-right argument for qualified immunity in the Bivens context, although to date, the 
Court has just mechanically equated immunities under Bivens with immunities under Section 1983. 
See supra note 15. 
 100. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 101. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Two Wrongs Make a Right: The Judicialization of Standardless 
Rulemaking, REGULATION, July–Aug. 1977, at 38. But see Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 
167, 204 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]wo wrongs do not make a right.”). 
 102. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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action taken “under color of” state law.103 Although this obviously applies to 
action that is authorized by state law, does it apply to action that is illegal as a 
matter of state law? Monroe v. Pape held that illegal action is indeed covered, 
and Justice Scalia later disagreed.104 
Justice Scalia instead endorsed Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Monroe.105 
That is often a good practice. Frankfurter was a perspicacious skeptic in federal 
jurisdiction cases (think of his Lincoln Mills dissent,106 his Tidewater dissent,107 
and the fact that the first edition of Hart and Wechsler was dedicated to him108). 
Moreover, his position in Monroe has an intuitive appeal: many things that are 
unconstitutional are also illegal as a matter of state law. The Constitution does 
not let officers break into your house and harass you for no reason, but neither 
does battery law or the code for the use of force. So when an officer acts 
contrary to both the law of Illinois and the Constitution, does he really act 
“under color” of the law of Illinois? 
This position makes sense, and one can see why Justices Scalia and 
Frankfurter might have held it as a hypothesis109—it was my initial hypothesis 
as well. The problem is that there is historical reason to doubt it. Section 1983 
provides liability for those who act “under color of” state law—not merely 
“under” it or “consistent with” it—and it turns out that “under color of” is a 
longstanding legal term that encompasses false claims of legal authority. 
As Steven Winter has recounted, the usage goes back more than 500 
years, when an English bail bond statute voided obligations taken by sheriffs 
“by colour of their offices” without complying with a statutory procedure. The 
English court concluded that to act “by colour of” one’s office (or “colore 
officii sui”) included an illegal act. The phrase “signifies an act badly done 
under countenance of an office, and it bears a dissembling visage of duty, and 
is properly called extortion.”110 Subsequent decisions from American courts in 
the nineteenth century similarly agreed that “under color of law referred to 
 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 104. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 224–25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 106. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475–77 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 107. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 652 n.3 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
 108. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM, at ix (1st ed. 1953). 
 109. Justice Frankfurter did not rely on much historical evidence, Steven L. Winter, The 
Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 325 (1992), but his position was 
subsequently defended by Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of 
Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985) (cited in Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 830 
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 110. Winter, supra note 109, at 344 (quoting Dive v. Manningham, 1 Plowden Rep. 60, 67–68, 
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official action without proper authority.”111 So “under color of” seems to 
perfectly include police officers and other officials who abuse or exceed their 
state-granted authority. 
There is also evidence that the original framers of the Ku Klux Act 
understood the phrase in its traditional sense. Professor David Achtenberg has 
argued that there is circumstantial confirmation from the way the statute was 
drafted: Representative Shellabarger oversaw the insertion of the phrase “under 
color of” to replace the phrase “under pretense of.”112 Yet Shellabarger was 
more radical than the previous drafter, and his changes consistently broadened 
the availability of relief, so it seems unlikely that “under color of” was 
supposed to be more limited than “under pretense of,” the phrase that it 
replaced.113 To be sure, Justice Scalia likely would not have cared about 
drafting history that is inconsistent with the apparent meaning of the text, but 
he did give weight to an established meaning of legal terms of art.114 
In his Crawford-El dissent, Justice Scalia implied that his skepticism was 
bolstered by a more practical intuition that Monroe v. Pape had wrought a 
radical change to the meaning of Section 1983. As quoted above, he described 
Monroe as having “changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in the 
first 50 years of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of 
thousands of suits each year,”115 implying that the vast rise of constitutional 
torts in the second half of the twentieth century was proof that Monroe was 
wrongly decided. Some commentary by Monroe’s supporters furthers the 
impression that the case was revolutionary.116 
Let us put aside the point that Justice Scalia’s numbers may be overstated: 
in the first fifty years there were fewer cases of all kinds, and Justice Scalia did 
not tell us the fraction of early Section 1983 suits.117 More fundamentally, there 
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 117. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 
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is another, more modest explanation for the small number of early Section 
1983 suits: there were not many judicially recognized constitutional rights for 
decades after Reconstruction. It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court 
incorporated First Amendment protections against the states,118 and not until 
1949 that the Court confirmed that “the core of the Fourth Amendment” was 
incorporated.119 Even if one thinks—as I do—that incorporation was 
commanded by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,120 it is still 
true that incorporation was not well received in the courts.121 Thus, it is little 
surprise that there weren’t as many suits. 
3. The Mismatch Problem 
There is a second and more important problem with Justice Scalia’s 
argument that two wrongs make a right. Even if we accept its premise as true, 
the results ought to be nothing like the modern regime of qualified immunity. If 
Justice Frankfurter was right about Monroe v. Pape, the resulting immunity 
ought to be nearly the opposite of the immunity regime we now have. 
To see why, we must first reconstruct Justice Frankfurter’s position, on 
which Justice Scalia relies.122 As a first approximation, Justice Frankfurter 
thought that an official acts “under color of” state law when his conduct is 
authorized by that law, and not when it is illegal.123 But Frankfurter’s position 
had some additional subtleties. In many cases it will be unclear exactly whether 
a given course of conduct is legal under state law. In other cases it is possible 
that conduct will be unauthorized as a matter of the written statutes, but 
nonetheless permitted as a practical matter. And Section 1983 cares about 
unwritten law just as written law, since it treats “customs” or “usages” the same 
as “statutes.”124 
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Justice Frankfurter admitted all of this,125 but he also had the insight that 
state remedial regimes and state courts can help us sort out authorized from 
unauthorized conduct. When a plaintiff seeks relief in state court under state 
law, we learn something about the legal status of the official’s conduct. 
Consider the following four possibilities under Frankfurter’s view: 
1. If the state holds the conduct lawful, then we now know that a 
federal suit can be brought. 
2. If the state holds the conduct illegal and provides a remedy, 
then the plaintiff will be compensated. A Section 1983 suit 
will be unavailable, but it will also be unneeded. 
3. If the state holds the conduct illegal but nonetheless refuses to 
provide a remedy because of some official immunity, that 
establishes that the official did indeed act under color of state 
law.126 A federal suit can be brought here as well. 
4. Finally, if the state holds that there is no remedy for generally 
applicable procedural reasons,127 we have learned nothing 
about the official’s legal status. 
Despite the importance of a possible state suit, Justice Frankfurter did not 
think that the statute contained an exhaustion requirement, stressing that 
“[p]rosecution to adverse judgment of a state-court damage claim cannot be 
made prerequisite to [Section 1983] relief.”128 If an official’s legal status is 
clear enough from the text of state statutes or municipal ordinances, a federal 
court can consider the case straightaway.129 But in the “admittedly more 
difficult ones” that lay “[b]eyond these cases,”130 the court could presumably 
take guidance from the state’s remedial regime.131 
The Frankfurter regime thus has an internal logic. When the state 
remedies its officials’ own wrongs, there is no need for federal liability. When 
the state legalizes or immunizes an official’s conduct, federal law supplies a 
forum for constitutional adjudication. On this view, Section 1983 creates a 
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federal forum when states refuse to do so for self-interested reasons, and thus 
moves closer to the oft-recited (though sometimes breached) principle that 
“every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper 
redress.”132 The “under color of” state law requirement then withholds that 
forum where it would be redundant with state tort law. 
Frankfurter’s position does not yield modern qualified immunity doctrine, 
nor does it require any federal immunities. A government’s grant of immunity 
is a sign that the officer is acting partly under the authority of that government. 
Thus, immunities in state law are used as a trigger for liability. 
Rather, under Frankfurter’s view, Section 1983 fills in a remedial gap: it 
provides a federal forum for conduct legalized or immunized by the state. Yet 
qualified immunity entirely ignores both state liability and state immunity. A 
devotee of the Frankfurter position ought to analyze qualified immunity (if at 
all) by reference to state law to see where Monroe v. Pape has resulted in 
double tort coverage. That would mean denying immunity in cases where states 
grant it, while granting immunity only in cases where states deny it. Yet 
modern qualified immunity doctrine looks nothing like this. 
If anything, modern qualified immunity does the opposite of what it ought 
to under the Frankfurter position. As discussed in Part I.A., qualified immunity 
comes closer to tracking state common law than it does to filling in state law’s 
gaps. Frequently, an official who acts egregiously and in bad faith is potentially 
liable under both state tort law and constitutional doctrine; an official who acts 
mistakenly but in good faith will be liable under neither one. 
To be sure, the power of this criticism depends a lot on how brutal a 
compensating adjustment is allowed to be.133 If one looks with a wide enough 
lens, one might say that it’s enough that the first decision erroneously expanded 
the number of lawsuits and the second decision will decrease the number of 
lawsuits. 
But this isn’t and shouldn’t be a well-accepted theory of compensating 
adjustments. First, with the lens that wide nearly every doctrine of 
constitutional law and civil procedure would be swept in. The theory would not 
provide special justification for the doctrine of qualified immunity. Second, to 
the extent that the original scheme had an animating purpose or logic, one 
would expect the adjustment to be consistent with that purpose. For instance, it 
would be a far closer approximation to the Frankfurterian scheme to require 
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that Section 1983 claims be exhausted134 or to substantively alter the doctrine 
for certain kinds of constitutional claims (like excessive force claims, 
perhaps).135 For sophisticated proponents of compensating adjustments, there 
are plenty of hard questions about how to choose among possible compensating 
adjustments.136 But for present purposes, it is enough to say that only an 
extremely crude theory could justify the Court’s current qualified immunity 
jurisprudence.137 
C. The Lenity Theory 
1. The Court’s Account 
That leaves us with the oldest of the Court’s justifications for qualified 
immunity, one based in lenity. It derives from cases that read a related 
enforcement provision in light of the need for fair warning, and later extended 
similar principles to Section 1983. 
Section 1983 is not the only Reconstruction-era statute that enforces 
constitutional rights against state officials. In addition to the civil rights suits 
authorized by Section 1983, Congress passed a criminal prohibition too—
beginning with the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and then modified to include the 
language of the Ku Klux Act.138 Now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242, the 
prohibition provides: 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, 
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, 
pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by 
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of 
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citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .139 
That provision does not contain any written defenses, aside from what can be 
read into the requirement of a “willful” mens rea. But once again, that does not 
mean that no defenses exist. 
Criminal prosecution under this statute can raise a genuine problem of 
notice. The statute criminalizes a violation of constitutional rights, and 
everybody can easily read the Constitution for themselves. But as John 
Marshall reminded us, the Constitution does not “partake of the prolixity of a 
legal code.”140 So simply reading the Constitution does not always tell an 
official much about what conduct the law forbids. 
The fair notice problem is mitigated as we let judges expound and clarify 
the legal meaning of the Constitution’s terms. Yet since the interpretations can 
change and are subject to contestation, a rule of narrow construction provides 
some leeway to those who could not fairly anticipate a change in judicial 
doctrine. 
These principles animated the Court’s early decision in United States v. 
Screws.141 There, the Court reviewed the conviction of three Georgia officials 
who were prosecuted under the contemporary version of Section 242 for 
beating a handcuffed man to death. Two of the Justices were inclined to affirm 
the convictions.142 Three others thought a federal conviction was not legally 
possible.143 That left Justice Douglas writing the plurality, and likely 
controlling, opinion. The statute might be unconstitutional, the plurality 
conceded, if it were read to broadly criminalize any violation of “a large body 
of changing and uncertain law,” especially under the Due Process Clause.144 
But the statute could be “confined more narrowly” and therefore withstood the 
charge of vagueness.145 
That narrower interpretation had two parts. First the statute required a 
“willful” act, which could be interpreted “as connoting a purpose to deprive a 
person of a specific constitutional right.”146 But that alone did not solve the 
problem if “neither a law enforcement official nor a trial judge can know with 
sufficient definiteness the range of rights that are constitutional.”147 So the 
specific intent had to be still more specific: to refer not just to constitutional 
rights but to rights made “definite by decision or other rule of law.”148 The 
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opinion repeated the formulation in various ways and said it would target 
somebody who “acts in defiance of announced rules of law” and “knows 
precisely what he is doing.”149 
Because that new construction was inconsistent with the jury instructions, 
the plurality voted to remand for a new trial. That meant a three-way split on 
the proper disposition, with different Justices affirming, reversing with no new 
trial, or remanding with a new trial. To avoid a “stalemate,” Justice Rutledge 
agreed to vote for a remand for a new trial under the plurality’s opinion, rather 
than stick with his first choice to affirm.150 This likely turned the plurality’s 
opinion into the controlling opinion, and it has since been adopted by the full 
Court.151 
The exact character of the “fair warning”152 limiting construction was a 
little ambiguous. One might describe it as the rule of lenity favoring narrow 
construction of criminal statutes. One might instead describe it as a distinct rule 
that broad constructions of the criminal law cannot be applied retroactively. Or 
one might describe it as a rule that vague criminal statutes are unconstitutional, 
which the statute should be construed not to be. Indeed, the Court has since 
said that all three of those descriptions are “related manifestations of the fair 
warning requirement” applied to Section 242.153 
These cases provide the final potential grounding for the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. The theory of lenity and fair warning imagines a state 
official as akin to a criminal defendant in need of special solicitude before 
being punished. 
Modern qualified immunity doctrine does not usually mention the 
criminal rule of lenity, and one might have expected it to be limited to criminal 
cases. But in some opinions, the Court has equated the two. It has explicitly 
said that “[o]fficers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal 
offense defined in 18 U.S.C. § 242.”154 And in its most recent decision about 
the scope of criminal liability under Section 242, the Court has confirmed the 
connection, stating that “in effect the qualified immunity test is simply the 
adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials . . . the same protection 
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from civil liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally 
possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes.”155 
To be sure, there is something counterintuitive about supposing that 
constitutional law itself can be unconstitutionally vague, or that government 
officials, of all people, need not know it.156 But once one is looking for it, the 
lenity connection may also explain some of the Court’s elaborations of the 
qualified immunity standard. For instance, when the Court says that only “the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” can be held 
liable,157 it seems to be adverting to criminal recklessness or deliberate 
wrongdoing. When the Court says that the Fourth Amendment is not enough to 
clearly establish the unreasonableness of most violations of the Fourth 
Amendment,158 it seems to be adverting to the problem of criminal vagueness 
in light of the fact that the Constitution is not written out as a legal code. 
Qualified immunity seems to rest on an intuition that officials are not to blame 
for reasonable mistakes. 
But does this justification actually support modern immunity doctrine? 
Some of its premises are legally sound: criminal prohibitions should be read in 
light of longstanding legal and interpretive principles, and constitutional 
avoidance and lenity are such principles. And yet . . . 
2. The Civil/Criminal Problem 
One could fairly have more misgivings about importing the limited 
construction of the criminal statute to the civil one. 
To be sure, the Court has sometimes applied the canonically criminal 
“rule of lenity” in civil cases, if the same language has parallel application in a 
criminal case. For instance, the Court in U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. 
confronted “a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting” but applied the 
rule of lenity because the statute also had “criminal applications.”159 This rule 
tracked some language in previous tax cases.160 
The Court has since done the same thing when defining “aggravated 
felony” for purposes of the immigration laws, reasoning: 
Although here we deal with [18 U.S.C.] § 16 in the deportation 
context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and 
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noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute 
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or 
noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.161 
However, this “civil” rule of lenity might not carry over to Section 1983. 
Unlike the statutes at issue in Leocal and Thompson, Section 1983 does not 
have criminal applications; it simply parallels the language of another statute 
that does, 18 U.S.C. § 242. Thus, Section 1983 does not quite implicate the 
“unitary principle” that “a term occurring a single time in a single statutory 
provision should have a single meaning.”162 
Moreover, there is also an important textual difference between the two 
civil rights provisions. Section 242 applies only to those who “willfully” 
violate constitutional rights, while Section 1983 contains no such limitation. In 
Thompson, the plurality hinted that this was a relevant distinction, pointing out 
that the tax statute at issue there “has criminal applications that carry no 
additional requirement of willfulness.”163 
Indeed, the Court made a similar point about the two civil rights statutes 
in Monroe v. Pape, specifically noting: 
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal 
penalties for acts “willfully” done. We construed that word in its 
setting to mean the doing of an act with “a specific intent to deprive a 
person of a federal right.” We do not think that gloss should be placed 
on [§ 1983] which we have here. The word “willfully” does not appear 
in [§ 1983.] Moreover, [§ 1983] provides a civil remedy, while in the 
Screws case we dealt with a criminal law challenged on the ground of 
vagueness. Section [1983] should be read against the background of 
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences 
of his actions.164 
While this passage is somewhat opaque, it and Thompson cut against the 
application of the criminal rule of lenity to Section 1983. 
We could also consider the related doctrine of constitutional fair warning. 
To the extent that the fair warning principle derives from the Constitution’s 
Due Process Clause, due process is required both for deprivations of liberty (as 
in many criminal cases) and for deprivations of property (as in civil actions for 
damages).165 
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 163. 504 U.S. at 517. 
 164. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (internal citations omitted). 
 165. Cf. Stinneford, supra note 153, at 2001 (arguing that the historical “rule of strict 
construction of penal statutes” was connected to the Due Process Clause’s protection of life and 
liberty). 
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However, criminal prosecutions have generally been thought to present 
distinct fair-warning concerns that do not apply to civil statutes. As the Court 
has put it: “The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is 
higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for 
enforcement.”166 However, a more recent case, FCC v. Fox, may have blurred 
that line because it applied criminal vagueness precedents in a civil case.167 
Thus, it is possible that qualified immunity doctrine under Section 1983 
could be justified on fair notice and lenity principles, but that would require 
some extension of the current version of those principles. 
3. The Mismatch Problem 
Even if we grant that Section 1983 falls within the domain of lenity and 
fair notice, there is a less lofty reason that those principles cannot justify 
qualified immunity doctrine: Qualified immunity doctrine has come to bear 
little practical resemblance to the rules applicable to criminal defendants. 
Consider how the Court treats judicial disagreement in both the criminal 
and qualified-immunity contexts. Many cases in the Supreme Court have been 
subject to a “circuit split,” meaning that the lower courts have disagreed. When 
judges disagree, that might be a clue that the legal question is hard and the 
materials are ambiguous.168 If the materials are ambiguous, that is reason to 
favor the criminal defendant or official. But the Court treats qualified immunity 
and the ordinary criminal defendant in almost the opposite fashion.169 
Indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected the relevance of circuit splits to 
the lenity inquiry, stating that “we [have not] deemed a division of judicial 
authority automatically sufficient to trigger lenity.”170 When faced with a 
defendant who asked for a fair notice defense because his circuit had 
established precedent construing a criminal statute more narrowly, the Court 
said no: reliance on this precedent was “unavailing since the existence of 
conflicting cases from other Courts of Appeals made review of that issue by 
 
 166. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 
489, 498–99 (1982). 
 167. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (applying criminal 
vagueness precedents in a civil case); see also Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, The 
Enduring and Universal Principle of “Fair Notice,” 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 198 (2013) (asserting 
that Fox equated the two standards). 
 168. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J. 159 
(2016). But see William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, Arguing with Friends (U. Chi. Pub. Law Working 
Paper No. 630) (July 3, 2017 draft), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985032 [https://perma.cc/7WL5-
93MR] (arguing that this should depend on shared methodology). 
 169. For similar observations, see Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance 
Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 585 (1998); David B. Owens, Comment, Fourth Amendment 
Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 563, 589 (2010). 
 170. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). 
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this Court and decision against the position of the respondent reasonably 
foreseeable.”171 
People regularly go to jail over this issue. In the past few years, for 
instance, the Court has ruled for the government in at least seven substantive 
criminal law cases where a lower court had adopted the defendant’s position.172 
In none of those cases did it apply the rules of lenity or fair warning or suggest 
that the division was relevant.173 
In Section 1983 cases, by contrast, a circuit split is considered a strong 
point in favor of the official. Indeed, those cases come close to establishing that 
a circuit split is a per se defense of the official’s conduct in circuits where the 
issue was unsettled. In Wilson v. Layne, for instance, the Court concluded that 
police officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by inviting members of the 
press to tag along during a home search.174 But the Court also concluded that 
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, noting that the question was 
“by no means open and shut”175 and that the officers had reasonably relied on 
established policy. It closed with an invocation of the fair notice principle in 
light of judicial disagreement: 
Between the time of the events of this case and today’s decision, a split 
among the Federal Circuits in fact developed on the question whether 
media ride-alongs that enter homes subject the police to money 
damages. If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is 
unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side 
of the controversy.176 
 
 171. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984). For criticism of the rule, see Trevor 
W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 461 (2001). 
 172. See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (rejecting view of United States v. 
Nobriga, 474 F. 3d 561 (9th Cir. 2006)); Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016) (rejecting 
view of United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007)); Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
958 (2016) (rejecting view of United States v. Trogdon, 339 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2003), and also 
expressly rejecting application of lenity); Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785 (2015) (rejecting 
view of United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179 (10th Cir. 1973)); Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
2384, 2388 (2014) (rejecting view of United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 197 (3rd Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2000); and United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 
92–93 (2d Cir. 1997)); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014), rev’g 695 F.3d 582 
(6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1146 (2014), vacating 676 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 173. Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act as vague, is a rare case that mentions “numerous splits among the lower federal courts” 
as a point in the defendant’s favor. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015). But it is still a far cry from the kind 
of near-dispositive relevance they get in qualified immunity cases. Indeed, the Court wrote that “[t]he 
most telling feature of the lower courts’ decisions is not division about whether the residual clause 
covers this or that crime (even clear laws produce close cases); it is, rather, pervasive disagreement 
about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to 
consider.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. 526 U.S. 603, 609–14 (1999). 
 175. Id. at 615. 
 176. Id. at 618 (internal citations omitted). 
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That passage turned out to be an important part of Wilson, which provided a 
shield for law enforcement officers to claim that judicial disagreement should 
give them immunity from constitutional tort.177 
In Safford v. Redding, the Court again held that officials had committed a 
Fourth Amendment violation, albeit in the very different context of a strip 
search of a 13-year-old girl suspected of possessing Ibuprofen at school.178 The 
Court held, although guardedly, that qualified immunity nonetheless attached 
because of the state of judicial disagreement: 
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the 
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, 
or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of 
judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically 
render the law unclear if we have been clear. That said, however, the 
cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see 
them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and 
dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in 
the prior statement of law.179 
The Court has continued to find immunity on the basis of judicial 
disagreement. For instance, it quoted Wilson again in Reichle v. Howards.180 It 
then held in Lane v. Franks that a defendant was entitled to qualified immunity 
even though other circuits had (correctly) held his conduct unconstitutional, 
because the defendant was allowed to ignore those decisions and rely on his 
own circuit’s (erroneous) precedent.181 And most recently in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
the Court granted federal officials qualified immunity from a claim of 
conspiracy to violate civil rights because of judicial disagreement about the 
definition of conspiracy, reasoning that “[w]hen the courts are divided on an 
issue so central to the cause of action alleged, a reasonable official lacks the 
notice required before imposing liability.”182 
 
 177. Cf. John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October 
Term 2008, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 429, 441 (2009) (noting that passage was “much beloved by the SG’s 
Office”). 
 178. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 376–77 (2009). There was 
surprisingly pointed debate in the Ninth Circuit about whether the search was technically a “strip 
search.” Compare Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1080–81 (en banc), 
with id. at 1091 n.1 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The Court commented: “The exact label for this final 
step in the intrusion is not important, though strip search is a fair way to speak of it.” 557 U.S.at 374. 
 179. Safford, 557 U.S. at 378–79. 
 180. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 669–70 (2012); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 245 (2009). 
 181. 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014). 
 182. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868 (2017) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) and 
Reichle, 566 U.S. at 669–70). Ziglar was a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, originally enacted as a related 
part of the Ku Klux Act. Until Ziglar, there was a circuit split about whether qualified immunity 
applied to suits under Section 1985. Compare Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 970 F.2d 
785, 794 (11th Cir. 1992), with Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1102 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari, Morgan v. Swint, 514 U.S. 1003 (1995) (No. 93-1638), cert. denied 514 U.S. 
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In some other cases, the Court has hinted at going farther, suggesting that 
even where a circuit decision in the relevant circuit had clearly established that 
an action was unlawful, officials might still be justified in treating that opinion 
with skepticism until the Supreme Court has weighed in.183 While the Court 
has not (yet?) treated judicial disagreement as the source of a per se immunity, 
the difference between the Court’s treatment of immunity analysis and of 
ordinary criminal cases is stark. Criminal defendants never get such solicitude. 
If the only legal basis for qualified immunity doctrine is as an extension 
of the lenity and fair warning principles, then the doctrine needs to be radically 
overhauled. The Justices regularly empathize with officials subject to suit, 
asking if the official can really be expected to anticipate constitutional rulings 
that even federal appellate judges did not. But one rarely sees a similar 
empathy for regular criminal defendants, and indeed the Court’s decisions do 
not bear it out.184 
Thus the lenity theory, while in some respects the most obscure, might be 
the best path to some kind of immunity. But it seems to justify a much more 
modest immunity doctrine than the one we have, one that at most, tracks the 
modest defenses available to real criminal defendants. 
D. What Immunity Can Be Justified? 
1. Justifying Qualified Immunity? 
Close inspection suggests that something has gone wrong, as a legal 
matter, in the Court’s immunity doctrine. But it is not the case, as more 
extreme accounts have suggested,185 that Section 1983 permits absolutely no 
immunities at all because the text is categorical on its face. Unwritten defenses 
are not unknown to the law. The real problem with qualified immunity is that it 
is so far removed from ordinary principles of legal interpretation. 
To be sure, this assessment of qualified immunity depends on how much 
freedom judges have in interpreting law. If one takes a very freewheeling view, 
one could decide that one of the Court’s theories provides an adequate seed for 
some kind of immunity, and that such an immunity can then be reshaped at the 
Court’s will, even in very dramatic ways. But I doubt that judges have such 
 
1003 (1995). Ziglar held that it did, though the Court and the parties did not mention that it had been 
an open question. 
 183. See Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014); see also Richard M. Re, Should 
Circuit Precedent Deprive Officers of Qualified Immunity?, RE’S JUDICATA (Nov. 17, 2014, 6:49 
AM), http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/11/17/should-circuit-precedent-deprive-officers-
of-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/66K9-GY6L] (assessing Carroll). 
 184. One could instead solve the mismatch by giving all criminal defendants the equivalent of 
qualified immunity. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 168, at 172–73. 
 185. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 356–63 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558–59 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367, 379 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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broad power under the norms that are (mostly) observed by our legal system.186 
In any event, if this is the way to justify qualified immunity, it emphasizes how 
much the immunity doctrine is a product of the Court’s own choices and not 
ordinary posited law. Exposing the Court’s choices lets us make a clearer and 
more responsible decision about whether those choices are the right ones or 
whether, having given us such a categorical immunity doctrine, the Court 
should now take some of it back. 
Similarly, it is possible that the Court could put forward an entirely new 
legal argument for qualified immunity. Maybe Section 1983 could be 
reconceived as a common-law statute analogous to the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.187 Of that statute, the Court has concluded that Congress “expected the 
courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate”188 by “recognizing and 
adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated 
experience.”189 The Court has so far denied a similar kind of adapting role in 
creating immunities under Section 1983.190 
An ambitious interpreter might also try to justify qualified immunity as an 
application of the absurdity doctrine, which rejects interpretations that “would 
produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have 
intended.”191 Even accepting the validity of the absurdity doctrine,192 it seems 
counterintuitive at best to say that Congress could not have intended a regime 
without qualified immunity, given the historical periods in which we got by 
without it.193 In any event, the Court has not attempted this path either. 
Finally, the Court might attempt to justify immunity on purely functional 
grounds. Its cases already put forward some functional justifications for 
immunity, noting that it “free[s] officials from the concerns of litigation, 
including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery,’”194 and responds to “the danger 
 
 186. Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1138–39. 
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 188. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
 189. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John 
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as a “super statute” and arguing that Section 1983 has become one as well). The relationship of “super 
statutes” to “common law statutes” is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 
2427, 2442–44 (2014). 
 192. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 234–39 (2012), with John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387 (2003). 
 193. See supra notes 46–66 and accompanying text. 
 194. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 
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that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or 
the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their 
duties.’”195 So far, though, the Court has used more traditional legal arguments 
as the opening wedge for these policy concerns. If the statute and its 
background principles do not authorize this immunity, the Court would have to 
assert a more freestanding justification. 
What all of these hypothetical interpretive approaches have in common is 
that they would more explicitly foreground the live policy debates about 
whether qualified immunity is wise or useful and about how it interacts with 
other aspects of our legal regime such as indemnification, sovereign immunity, 
and doctrinal change.196 It is far from clear that qualified immunity would 
survive those debates unscathed. So perhaps qualified immunity doctrine can 
be made lawful, though I doubt it, and in any event that question ought to 
preoccupy us far more than it does. 
2. Justifying Other Immunities 
Finally, it may well be that some of the other immunities recognized by 
the Court’s cases stand on substantially firmer footing. For instance, the 
Court’s cases recognizing state sovereign immunity are basically correct (or at 
least, I have so argued).197 
It is possible that some official immunities, such as the absolute immunity 
given to judges for their judicial acts, could also be justified.198 Cases decided 
nearly contemporaneously with Section 1983’s enactment support judicial 
immunity. In 1869, the Court affirmed judicial immunity in a state disbarment 
suit, opining that “it is a general principle applicable to all judicial officers, that 
they are not liable to a civil action for any judicial act done within their 
jurisdiction.”199 The Court reaffirmed that rule again in 1872, the year after 
Section 1983 was enacted.200 The rule evidenced by these cases might well 
support something like the doctrine of judicial immunity. These immunity 
cases do require some extrapolation; it has been argued that the legislative 
history of Section 1983 rejects absolute judicial immunity.201 But my analysis 
 
 195. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 
581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 196. See supra notes 1–6. 
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be clear.”). 
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of qualified immunity does not necessarily imperil these other immunities, 
which might have their own firmer historical and legal bases. 
II. 
IMPLICATIONS 
A. Qualified Immunity Doctrine 
Suppose it is true that the Court’s proffered justifications for qualified 
immunity are shaky and that it does not hold up under ordinary principles of 
statutory interpretation. What should actually happen to modern qualified 
immunity doctrine? 
The most obvious possibility is that the Court could overrule or modify 
the doctrine. This possibility is obvious in the sense that it is straightforward, 
not in the sense that the Court is likely to do it. A doctrine’s lack of a legal 
basis is a necessary condition for overturning it, but it is not a sufficient one. 
Under orthodox rules of stare decisis, the Court might be extremely 
reluctant to overturn qualified immunity, even if it is wrong. The Court is 
generally extremely reluctant to overturn statutory precedents,202 and qualified 
immunity seems to be a largely statutory precedent. In statutory cases, the 
argument goes, Congress is fully capable of overruling precedent and is the 
better agent to do so.203 Because qualified immunity has been on the books for 
years and Congress has declined to revisit it, it may have obtained a belated 
Congressional imprimatur.204 
But qualified immunity doctrine seems unorthodox in several respects. 
First, it is not entirely clear that the Court views qualified immunity as a purely 
statutory rule, as opposed to a constitutionally protected one.205 The lenity 
rationale for qualified immunity has some constitutional overtones, and the 
early arguments rejected in Myers v. Anderson invoked constitutional 
considerations.206 Apart from the lenity rationale, qualified immunity and other 
official immunities do generally appear to be common-law rules, and Congress 
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normally can change the common law.207 But one might have anticipated the 
same thing about sovereign immunity, which the Court held Congress is largely 
powerless to abrogate.208 And when the Court held that legislative immunity 
survived Section 1983, it said it was willing to “assume, merely for the 
moment, that Congress has constitutional power to limit the freedom of State 
legislators acting within their traditional sphere.” But, it added, “[t]hat would 
be a big assumption.”209 
Despite these constitutional shadows, one can and probably should 
distinguish qualified immunity from these other immunities. Nevertheless, they 
are enough to show a path by which the Court might say that qualified 
immunity is not a purely statutory doctrine left to the pleasure of Congress. 
Indeed, Felix Frankfurter argued that reconsidering the interpretation of Section 
1983 was “the Court’s responsibility” because it was not “merely a mine-run 
statutory question,” but rather one that “has significance approximating 
constitutional dimension.”210 
Second, even while qualified immunity has remained in place, the Court 
has openly tinkered with it to an unusual degree. It explicitly eliminated the 
subjective component of immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, focusing the 
inquiry instead on “clearly established law.”211 It created a special sequencing 
requirement in Saucier v. Katz212 and then replaced it with a new set of 
principles in Pearson v. Callahan.213 These points may not show that qualified 
immunity is fundamentally unstable, but they suggest that the Court takes more 
ownership of it than more orthodox statutory doctrines. 
Even if the Court refuses to overrule qualified immunity, it might tinker 
with the doctrine more incrementally. Some suggest that this has already 
happened, arguing that after Harlow the Court reformulated the qualified 
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immunity to subtly strengthen it,214 or that the Roberts Court is now doing the 
same thing.215 The Court could cut back on some of the excesses of qualified 
immunity in similar fashion. As Richard Re has pointed out, when a line of 
doctrine points in a problematic direction, it is highly traditional to “narrow” 
it,216 leaving its roots intact while refusing to allow new branches to take their 
natural course. Justice Kennedy has suggested such an approach in the 
qualified immunity context.217 
B. The Qualified Immunity Docket 
Setting aside formal and informal tinkering with the doctrinal formula of 
qualified immunity,218 there is another important aspect of qualified immunity 
that might call for reconsideration: the Supreme Court’s special treatment of 
qualified immunity issues on its certiorari docket. There are two aspects to that 
special treatment, both of which seem to be getting more special in recent 
years. 
First, nearly all of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity cases come 
out the same way – by finding immunity for the officials. In the thirty-five 
years since it announced the objective-reasonableness standard in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, the Court has applied it in thirty qualified immunity cases.219 Only 
twice has the Court actually found official conduct to violate clearly 
established law. Those two findings, in Groh v. Ramirez and Hope v. Pelzer, 
occurred more than a decade ago. The former relied on a glaring mistake in a 
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view as to whether Cotton’s actions violated clearly established law”); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 
299, 313 (1996) (finding a right to interlocutory appeal but leaving the lower court the task of 
determining whether the summary judgment evidence “met the Harlow standard of ‘objective legal 
reasonableness’”). 
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search warrant;220 the latter involved the use of a hitching post for prison 
discipline in violation of longstanding circuit precedent.221 
Only two other qualified immunity cases could be counted as partial 
victories for the plaintiffs under the objective-reasonableness standard. In 2017 
in Hernandez v. Mesa, the Court reversed an award of qualified immunity 
because the Fifth Circuit had looked at the facts from the wrong vantage point, 
but remanded without deciding whether the officer’s conduct violated clearly 
established law under the correct vantage point.222 The other, Malley v. Briggs, 
dates back to 1986, and ordered a remand after rejecting, inter alia, an officer’s 
argument that so long as he does not lie, “the act of applying for a warrant is 
per se objectively reasonable.”223 Neither Hernandez nor Malley went so far as 
to actually find a violation of clearly established law. 
This asymmetry may have an important effect on how qualified immunity 
operates. The Court regularly reminds lower courts that “clearly established 
law” has to be understood concretely. It is not enough to say that the Fourth 
Amendment is clearly established and therefore all Fourth Amendment 
violations are contrary to clearly established law.224 Nor is it enough to say, 
more specifically, that case law clearly establishes that the excessive use of 
force in making an arrest is unconstitutional and therefore all excessive force 
violations are clearly-established-law violations.225 The more general the 
relevant precedents, the more obvious the violation needs to be.226 
This framework makes it hard to find a roadmap to the denial of immunity 
that could give a lower court confidence in its conclusion. Because the Court’s 
maps have nearly all been leading in the other direction, it becomes harder for 
lower courts to recognize a violation of clearly established law. 
On top of that, because lower courts are somewhat regularly reversed for 
erring on the side of liability, but almost never reversed for erring on the side of 
immunity, the current docket signals to lower courts that they should drift 
toward immunity. My tally of immunity cases, if anything, understates the 
strength of that signal by omitting the many other cases where the Court found 
an official’s conduct affirmatively lawful, thereby mooting the need to reach 
immunity.227 
 
 220. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004). 
 221. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–42 (2002). 
 222. 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017). 
 223. 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986). It is not clear that this case should even count, since the Court 
stressed that “[t]he question is not presented to us, nor do we decide, whether petitioner’s conduct in 
this case was in fact objectively reasonable.” Id. at 345 n.8. The case was never appealed after remand. 
 224. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1987). 
 225. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 
 226. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741–42 (2011); see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). 
 227. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (per curiam). 
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Moreover, the signal sent by these results is not accidental. The Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in these cases almost always previews the merits: all 
but two of the Court’s awards of qualified immunity reversed the lower court’s 
denial of immunity below.228 In other words, lower courts that follow Supreme 
Court doctrine should get the message: think twice before allowing a 
government official to be sued for unconstitutional conduct. 
Second, a series of Supreme Court decisions have also given qualified 
immunity special status as a matter of civil procedure. An official is entitled to 
consideration of a motion to dismiss before any discovery, contrary to a district 
court’s normal discretion to decide the timing of discovery and a motion to 
dismiss.229 An official is also entitled to an immediate appeal of the denial of 
that motion to dismiss, contrary to the normal rule that such denials are not 
appealable.230 Finally, an official is entitled to a second immediate appeal if his 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is likewise 
denied.231 
These latter two rules stem from the so-called collateral order doctrine 
established in 1949 by Cohen v. Beneficial Industry Loan.232 More recently, the 
Court suggested that the collateral order doctrine should not be extended233 and 
admitted that the doctrine “may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its 
internal logic.”234 Still, the Court has noted “the applicability of the doctrine in 
the context of qualified-immunity claims is well established.”235 And it has 
found time for a number of decisions about the scope of these interlocutory 
appeal rights.236 
Third, and finally, qualified immunity cases receive special privilege in 
the certiorari process. 
The Supreme Court decides five to six cases every year in a special 
fashion called summary reversal. Unlike the sixty to eighty “merits cases” that 
 
 228. The two are Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014), which affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s 
grant of qualified immunity, 523 Fed. Appx. 709 (2013), and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), 
which affirmed the en banc Fourth Circuit, 141 F.3d 111 (1998). 
 229. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–
18 (1982); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
507–12 (2010) (noting that outside of qualified immunity case, district court may permit some 
discovery while deferring ruling on motion to dismiss); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly: An 
Update After Matrixx, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 37, 48–50 (2012) (same). 
 230. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524–30. 
 231. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996). 
 232. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 233. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113–14 (2009). 
 234. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (no interlocutory appeal of “a question of 
‘evidence sufficiency’”); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007) (ignoring Johnson); Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014) (narrowing Johnson); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott 
v. Harris and the Future of Summary Judgment, 15 NEV. L.J. 1351, 1368–75 (2015) (criticizing 
Plumhoff’s expansion of the right to interlocutory appeal). 
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are decided after extensive briefing and oral argument, the summary reversal 
cases are decided solely on the basis of the lower court proceeding and the 
certiorari papers. In essence, this requires the lower court decision to be so 
obviously wrong that the Court can rush to judgment, and sufficiently 
important that it is worth the Court’s scarce attention despite the usual rule 
against “error correction.”237 
In a 2015 article on what I called the Court’s “shadow docket,” I 
attempted to count which categories of errors had been targeted for repeated 
attention by the Court’s summary reversal docket. The five seemingly special 
categories were: (1) refusals to uphold arbitration agreements, (2) failures to 
give district courts sentencing discretion under Booker, (3) grants of habeas 
corpus relief despite AEDPA, (4) grants of habeas relief where AEDPA was 
irrelevant, and (5) liability under Section 1983.238 
The ad hoc threshold for those “special” categories was at least three 
cases, approximating 5 percent of the summary reversal docket.239 At the time, 
it was not clear if qualified immunity made the list because only two of the 
three summary reversals of Section 1983 liability involved immunity. In the 
time since The Shadow Docket was published, however, it has become clear 
that qualified immunity is special. The Court has since added four more 
qualified-immunity summary reversals, bringing the total above any non-
habeas category.240 After one of those summary reversals, the Court also 
summarily remanded, or “GVRed,” three other qualified immunity cases for 
reconsideration in light of the summary reversal, hinting that their analysis was 
wrong and creating a multiplier effect.241 
All of this is unusual. The Court’s normal criteria for certiorari favor 
cases in which there is a split between lower courts or an important legal error. 
And the Court has specifically noted that fact-bound applications of existing 
law are generally unlikely to qualify as important enough for certiorari.242 But 
most of the Court’s qualified immunity decisions are just fact-bound 
applications of the already-established principle that liability requires clearly 
established law. So only a special dispensation from the normal principles of 
certiorari explains the Court’s qualified immunity docket. 
 
 237. See generally William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 25–30, 38–40 (2015); see also SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 238. Baude, supra note 237, at 32. 
 239. Id. 
 240. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015); Taylor v. 
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014). 
 241. See Hunter v. Cole, 137 S. Ct. 497 (2016); Piper v. Middaugh, 136 S. Ct. 2408 (2016); 
Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 242. SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error 
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”); see also 
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 34 (1993); Packwood v. 
Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1320–21 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J. as Circuit Justice); 
Cash v. Maxwell, 565 U.S. 1138, 1141 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
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Indeed, the Court has now explicitly acknowledged that qualified 
immunity has such a privileged status. In the 2015 case of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, police officers successfully petitioned for certiorari after the Ninth 
Circuit held that their conduct during an arrest violated both the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment. 
It was the former question that had split the circuits, but the officers 
backtracked and refused to challenge the most controversial part of the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding.243 The Court therefore dismissed that part of the case as 
improvidently granted. Curiously, however, it did not dismiss the other 
question about qualified immunity, even though there was no more of a circuit 
split implicated by that question. This prompted Justices Scalia and Kagan to 
dissent, arguing that the qualified immunity question would not have merited 
certiorari on its own and therefore there was no reason to keep it around.244 
This dissent in turn provoked a footnote from the majority, which said 
that “[b]ecause of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to society as a whole,’ 
the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual 
officers to liability.”245 This new justification for certiorari might suggest an 
even bigger rise in the Court’s immunity-protection docket. 
The Court’s enthusiasm for qualified immunity does not seem to be 
flagging. Two weeks after Sheehan, the Court granted certiorari and summarily 
reversed another denial of qualified immunity with no dissent noted.246 In 
November 2015, it summarily reversed another over Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent.247 In January 2017, the Court summarily reversed yet another denial of 
qualified immunity, noting that it had “issued a number of opinions reversing 
federal courts in qualified immunity cases”248 and that it had “found this 
necessary both because qualified immunity is important to ‘society as a 
whole,’”249 and “because as an ‘immunity from suit,’ qualified immunity ‘is 
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’”250 Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion.251 It is not clear that there is a consistent 
dissenter from the immunity-protection program.252 
 
 243. 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772–74 (2015). 
 244. Id. at 1779 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 245. Id. at 1774 n.3 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 
814 (1982)) (citing Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014); 
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013); Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012)). 
 246. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). It is not clear whether the vote was in fact 
unanimous, or whether the dissenters simply chose not to publish their views. See Baude, supra note 
237, at 18–19. 
 247. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). 
 248. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). 
 249. Id. (quoting Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3). 
 250. Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
 251. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 553 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that “the 
Court, as I comprehend its opinion, leaves open the propriety of denying summary judgment based on 
fact disputes over when Officer White arrived at the scene, what he may have witnessed, and whether 
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These developments can be criticized on their own terms. For instance, 
even if it is true that “qualified immunity ‘is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial,’”253 that is equally true of every defense 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, such as sovereign immunity254 
and criminal double jeopardy.255 But those defenses are not given the same 
pride of place on the Court’s docket. When the court originally described 
immunity as important “to society as a whole” in Harlow,256 it was simply 
making the point that the proper performance of public officials is of concern 
to the public.257 But that is true of nearly any alleged error in public law, and 
again it hardly follows that the fact-bound application of those doctrines 
deserves a special place on the Supreme Court’s agenda.258 
The legal flaws in the doctrine of qualified immunity cast an even more 
troubling light on this doctrinal activity. The Court is not just maintaining the 
doctrine of qualified immunity as a matter of precedent, but doubling down on 
it, enforcing it aggressively against lower courts. Indeed, its campaign to 
enforce qualified immunity in recent years has come to rival its campaign to 
enforce the restrictions on habeas relief, about which the Justices have been 
unusually explicit.259 
But the restrictions on habeas relief come from AEDPA—a federal statute 
that was enacted by Congress and that is clear about the limitations on relief, 
such as the requirement that the erroneous decision “was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”260 The Court’s crusade 
to enforce those limits can be justified as service to the rule of law, to ensure 
that federal courts do not disregard a federal statute simply because they find 
its implications troubling. 
 
he had adequate time to identify himself and order Samuel Pauly to drop his weapon before Officer 
White shot Pauly”). 
 252. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights?, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 893, 909 (2016) (reviewing SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015)) (“Although the Court is not always 
unanimous on these issues, it is fair to say that qualified immunity has been as much a liberal as a 
conservative project on the Supreme Court.”). 
 253. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). 
 254. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). 
 255. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977). 
 256. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). This proposition in Harlow is quoted in 
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1774 n.3 (2015) and in White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. 
 257. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 n.22 (citing Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, 
Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 281, 324–27 (1980)). 
 258. For the general point that the Court’s agenda does not and need not track society’s, see 
Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006). 
 259. Baude, supra note 237, at 26–27, 31–32. 
 260. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
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The opposite is true of Section 1983:261 that statute contains no explicit 
restrictions on monetary relief, and the restrictions imposed by qualified 
immunity have been wrongly imposed by the Court, not implied by the statute 
or the common law. The Court’s crusade to enforce the doctrine of qualified 
immunity does not serve congressional intent or the rule of law. Instead, it 
exacerbates the very kind of legal mistake that its habeas agenda is designed to 
correct. 
CONCLUSION 
In suggesting that the doctrine of qualified immunity is unlawful, I do not 
mean to raise foundational questions about the American legal order or the 
basic notion of government under law.262 Rather, I mean the more modest point 
that the doctrine lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are 
unpersuasive. 
Given the high stakes of government misconduct and the cynical cast of 
modern remedies scholarship, this inquiry may seem almost naive. But I submit 
that it is nonetheless of urgent importance. If qualified immunity leads to bad 
consequences, it can be fixed. But to fix it requires knowing who created it in 
the first place. If qualified immunity is unlawful, it can be overruled. And even 
if the Court does not overrule it, it can stop expanding the legal error. 
APPENDIX: SUPREME COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
STANDARD FROM 1982 THROUGH 2017 
Case Official Claim Lower Court 
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 
2003 (2017) ** 





Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 
(2017) 
U.S. Attorney General. 
other Department of 
Justice Officials, and 
Federal Corrections 
Officials  
Equal Protection  2d Cir. 
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 
(2017) 




 261. Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Summary Reversals in the Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 
591, 602 (2016) (footnote omitted) (quoting Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40 (2012)) (“In the 
habeas cases, the Supreme Court is enforcing a Congressional statute that specifically refers to ‘clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’ But the centralizing theme is also 
apparent in some of the qualified immunity cases, where Congress has not done anything of the sort.”). 
 262. Compare PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014), with 
Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015) (reviewing PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)). 
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Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 
(2015) 
State Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Excessive 
Force) 
5th Cir. 
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 
2042 (2015) 
State Corrections Officials 8th Amdt.  3d Cir. 
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. 
Ct. 1765 (2015) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Excessive 
Force) 
9th Cir. 
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 
348 (2014) 
State Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Illegal 
Entry) 
3d Cir.  








Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 
2012 (2014) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Excessive 
Force) 
6th Cir. 
Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 
(2014) 
Secret Service 1st Amdt. 
(Assembly) 
9th Cir. 
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 
(2013) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Illegal 
Entry) 
9th Cir. 
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 
658 (2012) 
Secret Service 1st Amdt. 
(Retaliation) 
10th Cir. 
Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 
(2012) 
City Outside Counsel Due Process  9th Cir.  
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 
U.S. 535 (2012) 
County Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. 
(Search/Seizure) 
9th Cir.  
Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469 
(2012) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. 
(Search/Seizure) 
9th Cir.  
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 
731 (2011) 
U.S. Attorney General 4th Amdt. (Arrest) 9th Cir.  
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) 
School Officials 4th Amdt. 
(Search/Seizure) 
9th Cir.  
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223 (2009) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Illegal 
Entry) 
10th Cir.  
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 
194 (2004) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Excessive 
Force) 
9th Cir.  
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 
(2004)* 
Federal Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. 
(Search/Seizure) 
9th Cir. 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 
(2002)* 
State Corrections Officials 8th Amdt. 11th Cir. 
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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 
(2001) 
Military Police 4th Amdt. (Excessive 
Force) 
9th Cir.  
Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 
(1999) 
Local Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Search) 9th Cir.  
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 
(1999) 
Federal & State Law 
Enforcement 
4th Amdt. (Search) 4th Cir.  
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 
(1991) 
Secret Service 4th Amdt. (Arrest) 9th Cir.  
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635 (1987) 
Federal Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. 
(Search/Seizure) 
8th Cir.  
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 
(1986)** 
State Law Enforcement 4th Amdt. (Arrest) 1st Cir.  
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 
(1984) 
State Law Enforcement Due Process 
(Employment)  
11th Cir. 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511 (1985) 
U.S. Attorney General 4th Amdt. 
(Search/Seizure) 
3d Cir.  
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982) 
Presidential Aides 1st Amdt. 
(Employment) 
D.C. Cir. 
* Supreme Court found no immunity. 
** Court reversed grant of immunity without deciding ultimate immunity 
question. 
 
